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But literal meaning may not (and in my view does not) go beyond truth conditions. Donald Davidson ('Communication and Convention', p. 269) Our difficulty arises from the fact that we have tried to characterize the activity of assertion without taking into account its being a conventional activity: the fact that a sentence expresses an act of assertion is as much a matter of linguistic convention as is its having the sense it has.
Michael Dummett (Frege: Philosophy of Language, p. 300.)
The aim of this chapter is to motivate and defend a conventional approach to assertion and other illocutionary acts.
1 Such an approach takes assertions, questions and orders to be moves within an essentially rule-governed activity similar to a game. The most controversial aspect of a conventional account of assertion is that according to it, for classifying an utterance as an assertion, question or command, 'it is irrelevant what intentions the person speaking may have had ' (Dummett 1973, p. 302) . I understand this to mean that it is irrelevant for the issue of whether an utterance is an assertion whether the utterer has certain communicative intentions, such as the intention to utter something true, the intention to get one's audience to believe (that one believes) what one has asserted etc. Just as one can commit a foul in football without meaning to do so, one can make an assertion, issue a command or ask a question without meaning to do so. The rules of football specify that a certain form of conduct (tackling an opponent in a certain way), carried out under certain general conditions (being a member of a team engaged in a game of football) counts as committing a foul. Similarly, I claim, the rules of language specify that a certain form of conduct (uttering an assertoric sentence), carried out under certain general Literal Force 109 conditions (being a member of a speech community engaged in a conversation) counts as making an assertion.
It is not part of the conventional approach defended here that there cannot also be a useful notion of assertion that is defined in terms of some suitable cocktail of communicative speaker intentions. On the contrary, a conventional account of assertion and other illocutionary acts is complemented by a pragmatic theory of the communicative intentions and actions of speakers. For this reason, I will distinguish conventional notions of C-assertion from notions of I-assertion: assertion defined in terms of the subject's communicative intentions. What is defended here is not an analysis of any pre-theoretical notion of assertion. Rather, I am defending the claim that C-assertion, C-question etc have an important and coherent role to play in a theory of linguistic communication.
The purpose of a conventional account of assertion is perhaps best explained by viewing it as the proposal that there is literal force in addition to literal content and literal sub-content. Most philosophers of language make a distinction between the literal, encoded meaning of utterance types, and the non-literal meaning which tokens (or tokenings) of those types can have on particular occasions of use.
2 Without the notion of literal meaning, we would presumably be forced to deny the existence of context-invariant meanings altogether. However, most philosophers of language employ such a distinction only at the level of the content, or sub-content, of utterances, not at the level of illocutionary force or speech acts. Most theorists have no room for a notion of literal assertion, i.e., a performance that counts as an assertion in virtue of the linguistic meaning of the utterance type used. Instead, these theorists employ a notion of assertion according to which asserting is a matter of having certain communicative intentions, with the result that they see themselves forced to deny the existence of illocutionary force indicators, i.e., context-invariant meaning at the level of speech acts. In this chapter, I want to provide some motivation for admitting a notion of literal assertion and distinguishing this from assertion conceived of in terms of speaker intentions. The second aim is to dispose of some objections that have been made against this type of theory, namely Davidson's and Stainton's objections against Dummett's conception of assertion as a conventional act.
Sections 1-3 are introductory. I begin in Section 1 with some general considerations about essentially rule-governed action. In Section 2 I give a general characterization of conventional accounts of assertion. In Section 3 I provide a general characterization of intentional accounts of assertion. Sections 4-6 provide various motivations for employing a conventional notion of assertion and other speech acts. In Section 4 I explain the role a conventional notion of assertion can play in dealing with indirect speech acts. In Section 5 I argue that the usual reasons for distinguishing between literal and non-literal meaning concern the force as much as the content
